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THINKING CLEARLY ABOUT PRIVACY
Thomas Huff*
And Noah began to be an husbandman, and he planted a vineyard:
And he drank of the wine, and was drunken; and he was uncovered
within his tent.
And Ham, the father of Canaan, saw the nakedness of his father, and told
his two brethren without.
And Shem and Japheth took a garment, and laid it upon both their shoul-
ders, and went backward, and covered the nakedness of their father; and
their faces were backward, and they saw not their father's nakedness.
And Noah awoke from his wine, and knew what his younger son had
done unto him.
And he said, Cursed be Canaan; a servant of servants shall he be unto his
brethren.
And he said, Blessed be the LORD God of Shem; and Canaan shall be his
servant.
God shall enlarge Japheth, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem; and
Canaan shall be his servant.I
The punishment which Noah metes out to Ham and the blessings he
bestows on Shem and Japheth demonstrate, at the least, a keen sense of
the character and importance of privacy. Indeed, what makes this little
story instructive is that it both captures the distinctive features of typical
privacy invasions and expresses accurately and dramatically the sort of
moral outrage felt by a person whose privacy has not been respected.
In a series of cases stretching back to 1965, the Supreme Court has had
great difficulty keeping the distinctive features of privacy clearly in
focus. 2 Under the aegis of a right of privacy, discovered in Griswold v.
Connecticut3 and elaborated in such cases as Stanley v. Georgia,4 Eisen-
* Professor of Philosophy, University of Montana; B.A. 1964, University of Colorado; Ph.D.,
1968, Rice University; Visiting Scholar, University of Washington School of Law, 1979-80.
Thanks are due the University of Montana for a sabbatical leave (1976) during which this article
was started and the National Endowment for the Humanities for their fellowship (1979-80) during
which it was completed. The author would also like to thank the University of Washington Law
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1. Genesis 9:20-27. -
2. This criticism has been made by a number of commentators. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of
Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 926-37 (1973). See generally, L.
TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTITUIONAL LAW 921-34 (1978). For discussion of several of these cases and
an attempt to relate them through the concepts of autonomy, intimacy, and identity, see Gerety,
Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REv. 233,269-81 (1977).
3. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
4. 394U.S. 557 (1969).
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stadt v. Baird,5 Roe v. Wade,6 Paul v. Davis,7 and Whalen v. Roe, 8 the
Court has dealt, often in very confusing ways, with an astonishingly
broad range of issues from personal liberty and autonomy to associational
and marital privacy. We must ask, what has a right of privacy to do with
the use of contraceptives (Griswold) or the termination of pregnancies
(Roe v. Wade)? Laws proscribing such conduct seem, at their worst, to be
paternalistic and, consequently, to invade personal autonomy rather than
privacy. Similarly, why are issues of individual liberty said to be at stake
in release by the police of photographs of persons under arrest (Paul) or in
centralized state record keeping of prescriptions of potentially dangerous
drugs (Whalen)? These cases seem to deal directly with issues of privacy
like those raised in the Noah story.
The values protected by the norm of privacy are important. We can
expect their protection by a right of privacy only if we think clearly about
just what is at stake when privacy is gained or lost. Similarly, many of the
values of personal liberty, like those raised in the abortion cases, deserve
careful consideration. They, too, cannot be protected unless we think sen-
sitively both about the limits of the right of privacy's protections and
about the meaning of personal liberty and autonomy.
The purpose of this article is to offer a fresh assessment of the right of
privacy. It begins with discussion of the privacy norm, drawing on our
ordinary judgments and experiences to clarify and elaborate the interest
persons have in privacy. It then reviews some of the Supreme Court's
reasoning on privacy, explains the Court's confusions, and proposes a
way that we and the Court might think more clearly about these difficult
matters. 9
I. THE PRIVACY NORM
A. Unauthorized Intrusions
Ham, in the Noah story, invades his father's privacy in two obvious
ways-by intruding upon his nakedness and by disclosing to his brothers
5. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
6. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
7. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
8. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1977)(right to abortions assured without parental or spousal consent); Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)(right to use contraceptives extended to minors); Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen.
Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977)(right to privacy not extended to prevent archivists from viewing presi-
dential papers some of which might be private).
9. As will become evident in the text, there is no attempt in this article to provide an exhaustive
review of the Supreme Court's treatment of the right of privacy. The purpose here is to identify.
explain, and clarify recurrent ambiguities in the Court's reasoning with respect to the right.
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what the intrusion reveals. But what makes his intrusion and his disclo-
sure an invasion of privacy and not a mere nuisance or what we might call
a defamation?'0 Consider intrusion first. Intrusions which are invasions of
privacy are distinctive, first of all, because they subject persons directly
to the conscious consideration of other persons. Ham's intrusion would
have been a mere nuisance had he only disturbed his father's sleep. The
interest he takes in what he sees, however, makes his actions like those of
a Peeping Tom or an eavesdropping relative. His father is literally ex-
posed, and Ham makes himself directly and deliberately conscious of that
fact.
There are obviously many kinds of intrusions which are not privacy
invasions because they lack this feature of conscious scrutiny. The noise
of a neighbor's radio or motorcycle, the disturbance caused by a construc-
tion project in the street, or the insipid music in the dentist's office all
intrude, but they intrude as nuisances or annoyances, not as privacy inva-
sions. Even the intruding person may be merely a nuisance if this essen-
tial feature of conscious scrutiny is missing. The boor who joins our con-
versations or enters our room uninvited fails to recognize that when we
are with others we are normally expected to acknowledge their very being
in our actions and words and to admit them to our thoughts and conversa-
tions. Such a person thus fails to recognize how his or her intrusion makes
claims upon us and thus fails to respect us. But this failure of respect is
similar to the intrusion of the neighbor's radio-we cannot do what we
were doing before because of the nuisance created by the sheer presence
of this person. We even call such persons "nuisances." Intrusions by
persons become privacy invasions when the intruder takes an interest in
what we are doing, in how we are conducting our lives, or in what we are
saying. When a child intrudes with questions there is only a nuisance-
the questions must be answered! The adult, however, who takes an
unwarranted-we sometimes say unhealthy-interest in our lives
breaches the privacy norm by placing himself or herself in the position of
knowing things about us which he or she should not know.
But what is it about this "knowing things about our lives" that is ob-
jectionable? Many persons, after all, have knowledge of us, even intimate
knowledge, without invading our privacy. What is also distinctive about a
privacy intrusion is that the knowledge which is gathered by the intruder
is knowledge which could make us subject to presumptuous evaluation or
10. On at least one line of argument the search for an interest protected by the right of privacy is
fruitless or misguided. See Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHILOSOPHY AND PUB. Air. 295 (1975);
Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? 31 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB.
326 (1966). Kalven suggests, for example, that some "rights" of privacy are merely attempts to
enlarge defamation and would better be left to the technical complexity of our present law of defama-
tion which deals well with insignificant dignitary harms. Id. at 341.
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which could place us in a position where we might have to be concerned
about the possibility of such evaluation. I" Consider how our social rela-
tionships, especially the relationship of friendship, and our sense of the
nature of private places suggest that the ultimate concern we have with
privacy is this concern with the possibility of unauthorized evaluation.
When we are with a friend, as opposed to a stranger, there is usually
little concern about privacy. This is so because we are secure exposing
the more intimate aspects of our lives to a friend-secure when faced with
the friend's use of what is learned from that exposure. We feel comfort-
able, for example, turning to a friend for advice because we trust the
friend to continue to care for us, to continue to respect us, despite what
may be known as a consequence of our request for help. We would never,
in other words, expect a friend to make us the mere object of his or her
judgment. An important and characteristic difference, then, between that
part of our lives conducted with family and friends and that part con-
ducted with strangers is the absence in the former, but not in the latter, of
a conscious awareness of ourselves as objects of evaluation. ' 2 We speak
of this part of our lives as conducted "in private" and as involving "pri-
vate relations" because this is where we are safe from scrutiny and thus
secure against evaluation. Moreover, we call the places where this part of
our lives is conducted "private places." Indeed, it is when we are in such
places that we are most comfortable "letting our hair down," exposing
11. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, NoMos XIII: PRIVACY I (J. Pennock & J.
Chapman eds. 1971), states a different, more general principle: "... [Any man who desires that he
himself should not be an object of scrutiny has a reasonable prima facie claim to immunity." Id. at
12. This principle of "presumptive immunity" Benn makes specific in three areas: First, he insists
privacy is important as an excluding condition-making possible intimate social relations, id. at
16-21; second and third, he stresses privacy's role protecting respectively "the free man in a mini-
mally regulated society," id. at 21, and the autonomous man against the pressures of conformity, id.
at 24.
12. See Rachels, Why Privacy is Important, 4 PHILOSOPHY AND PuB. AFF. 323 (1979). Rachels
finds the primary interest persons have in privacy in a different connection between privacy and social
relationships. He argues that our ability to control what is known about us is an essential ingredient in
our being able to develop and maintain social relationships, and that privacy's role is to provide this
control. Id. at 326-31. But exactly what role does privacy play? Different social relationships are
often characterized by the extent of intimacy. Just because these relationships typically exhibit a
certain willingness to reveal intimate information, however, does not mean they are necessarily
caused by these revelations. The cause-effect relation works both ways. There usually is friendship
before intimate revelation, though sometimes such intimacy (witness trustful and evoking revelations
by the friend) deepens the friendship, causing it to grow and endure. Primarily though it is because
we have friends that we are willing to reveal things about ourselves. This is so because we are secure
in revealing intimate things about ourselves to a friend-secure when faced with the friend's judg-
ment of us. What a correct analysis of the relationship of "friendship" to "intimacy" and "privacy"
should disclose is that differing social relationships determine when evaluations of our character and
conduct are appropriate, expected, or invited, and that the privacy norm operates to control the condi-
tions under which such evaluations are possible.
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our bodies and minds, and engaging in those intimate activities most eas-
ily disrupted by the presence of evaluational attitudes.
Because we recognize private relations and private places as safe in
these ways from evaluation, we can also better appreciate Noah's
outrage. At the core of what is objectionable about Ham's intrusion is his
presumption of permission to gain that knowledge which could make his
father the mere object of his evaluation-a presumption implicit in his
conscious scrutiny of the circumstances revealed in the tent. Intimate
friends and lovers do not ordinarily invade our privacy because they have
our permission to share, and thus know about, our lives. We would nei-
ther expect nor consider threatening their evaluations.1 3 Children have a
hard time invading privacy, because their ability to make judgments
based on the knowledge they gain by their intrusion is limited. Even
Ham's intrusion becomes more palpably a privacy invasion when we
know he actually takes a judgmental interest in what he sees, an interest
which was unjustified especially given his relationship to his father. 14
Moreover, because it is this potential for evaluation that is of concern in
privacy intrusions, the effect of an accidental intrusion can be mitigated
either by "putting out of mind" what we have seen or heard-by not
thinking about what we should not know, or, as Shem and Japheth do
when they back into their father's tent, by trying to make sure that no
adverse judgment can result.
B. Unauthorized Disclosures
The second major sort of privacy invasion we noted earlier involves the
disclosure of information. Ham not only intrudes upon his father, he ex-
hibits his judgmental interest in what his intrusion reveals and compounds
his invasion of his father's privacy by "telling his brethren without." We
have become particularly sensitive to privacy invasions by disclosure in
recent years because of the advent of information technologies. There are
13. Such evaluations would not only be inappropriate, they would be likely to destroy the rela-
tionship itself. Consider, for example, the lover who insensitively demands high standards of sexual
performance from his or her beloved. Even parents can invade their children's privacy by constantly
placing themselves in a position to know the intimate details of their child's life, especially when that
information is used to judge the child's motives or behavior.
14. Notice, though, that a privacy intrusion need not actually involve such a judgmental interest.
All that is essential is that the intruder be sufficiently aware of the significance of events observed to
be able to evaluate them. The voyeur may peek into my window with the intention of revitalizing a
fantasy rather than to make a judgment, but the peeking is into a place where security against the
possibility of evaluation is assumed and where, therefore, the voyeur can still become aware of
events or activities which might elicit an evaluation. By contrast, the child intruding into the marital
bedroom of the young couple, may, quite innocently, avoid a privacy invasion by being unable to
recognize the significance of events there.
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obvious and important similarities between privacy intrusions and re-
leases of private information. Both involve knowledge of us which pro-
vides a condition under which we might be evaluated. 15 In the intrusion
case it is direct observation of our lives which makes us subject to possi-
ble evaluation. In the information release case it is secondhand observa-
tion which occurs.
Our privacy is invaded by disclosures of information when the sort of
information which could make us subject to evaluation is transmitted to
persons who lack the authority to evaluate us. Again, intimate relations
with lovers and friends are instances in which this aspect of privacy is
often waived as a natural part of the relationships involved. But unlike the
intrusion case, there is no question of confusion with nuisances. Rather,
the interesting issues are when and what information about us ought to be
available to others.
In the information release case our privacy is obviously waived in those
circumstances in which evaluation is appropriate or approved. We release
our school or job records to prospective employers or graduate schools.
We submit our work to the evaluation of superiors. We expect our efforts
will be evaluated when we run races, play games, seek prizes, or run for
public office. In all these instances our privacy is not invaded by the dis-
closure of information because we choose to place ourselves in a position
where evaluations are expected. However, when information is released
without our permission, or is sought in contexts in which we have not
sought evaluation, as it is for example by the gossip, our privacy is in-
vaded. 16 It is invaded because we are treated as the potential objects of
others' gratuitous evaluations rather than as persons. ' 7
15. Because in most instances it is impossible directly to prevent persons from attempting to
evaluate us, the right of privacy protects, in part, by giving us control over that knowledge which
would ordinarily tend to license critical evaluations or lend them credibility.
16. There are instances in which we may become subject to evaluation less by choice than by
accident-situations where rights of free expression and press are also at issue. The ex-Marine who
saved President Ford's life by deflecting Sara Jane Moore's shot was discovered by the newspapers to
be a member of the San Francisco gay community. He has sued several California newspapers for an
invasion of his privacy. Abrams, The Press, Privacy, and the Constitution, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21,
1977, § 6 (Magazine) at 11.
17. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHILOSOPHY AND PUB. AFF. 26 (1976).
makes the claim that protecting privacy shows respect for persons by serving as "an essential part of
[a] complex social practice," id. at 39, which has a powerful impact on our conception of ourselves.
Privacy, he says, "protects the individual's interest in becoming, being, and remaining a person."
Id. at 44. It does this by requiring "that the individual be treated as entitled to determine when and by
whom his concrete reality ... [and] ... the thoughts in [his] head will be experienced by someone
other than [himiself .... " Id. at 42 and 43 respectively. But Reiman never tells us exactly which
observations of our "concrete reality" or "thoughts" will be privacy invasions, i.e., when the indi-
vidual ought to be in control. He says, for example, "It is sufficient that I can control whether and by
whom my body is experienced in some significant places and that I have the real possibility of repair-
ing to those places." Id. at 44.
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C. Dignitary Harms-Avoiding Overextensions of the Privacy Norm
When the interest in what others know about us is connected with pri-
vacy in the particular way suggested here, we should be able to specify
how the privacy norm's protections should be limited to avoid petty
claims to dignitary harms. 18 Socrates warns at the beginning of the Crito
that our concern should not be with the opinions men have of us but rather
with the truth of those opinions. Socrates would no doubt qualify such a
claim by repeating his insistence that the community provide an opportu-
nity for open discussions of men's views and their views of us. It is not
our image which is at stake, but the truth of that image and some opportu-
nity to respond to its erroneous disparagement. In the presence of modern
information technology, however, we may have lost the conditions under
which response to the views of others would be possible, and this fact
may make control of some aspects of our biography especially important.
Properly understood and applied, the privacy norm can provide that con-
trol. But there is an aspect of the legal protection of control over informa-
tion about persons in our day which is much less fortunate. This is an
inflated concern with "image." Such a concern reflects in part a lack of
trust in the judgment of fellow citizens-in their ability to distinguish
well-founded opinions and mere appearances. It also reflects a general
lack of venturesomeness-an unwillingness to take risks in a world which
has come considerably under our control. Certainly, the weaker our im-
age of ourselves, both as vulnerable to gossip and as morally weak, the
more distorted becomes our fear of being found out and the more strongly
we desire to control our image. A person who is self-respecting, self-
possessed, and venturesome is doubtless less afraid of what might be
found out about him or her.19 With the advent of modern information
systems, then, the privacy norm plays an important and essential role in
helping us control our lives by restricting how and when we might be
subject to evaluation. What is troublesome is that it can also be misused
to try to protect "images," which is dishonest and destructive of the very
social relations privacy helps protect.
D. The Cultural Factor
The analysis of the privacy norm's restrictions on intrusion and disclo-
The view presented here is that protection of the interests persons have in being free of intrusions
and able to control information about themselves shows respect in a specific way, viz., by helping to
assure that persons are not subject to certain evaluations by others. It does this by providing individu-
als with control over the knowledge necessary to such evaluations.
18. SeeKalven, supranote 1O, at341.
19. See Benn, supra note 11, at 25-26.
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sure of information also helps us to see that what makes some circum-
stances private and others not private will inevitably be bound up with our
culture and mores. We will not count as invasions of the privacy right
scrutiny of those of our activities where evaluations would be inconse-
quential or unproblematical. Someone may stare at a haircut across the
room or watch as a jogger passes in the park. In neither instance is there a
privacy invasion because we do not count such scrutiny to be of particular
significance. What we count as important spheres of evaluation will also
be what we count as important possible areas for privacy invasions. Shem
and Japheth took great pains not to see their father's nakedness-no doubt
more care than we might take. Their sense of how they might evaluate
their father's state determines which specific behavior shows respect, in
their culture, for privacy.
E. Tort Law Protections of Privacy
If the analysis of the privacy norm proposed here is correct, then it
ought to be confirmable in the experience of the development of the pri-
vacy tort, and in particular it ought to be able to show us how to draw
together the various elements of that tort. Prosser's authoritative sum-
mary of the development of the idea of a right of privacy classifies four
distinguishable torts: 20 intrusion into seclusion or private affairs; public
disclosure of potentially embarrassing facts; public release of information
which places a person in a false light; and appropriation of name or like-
ness for commercial or similar use. 2 1 It is not immediately clear how all
four of these torts can be connected with the privacy norm. Certainly the
first two-the intrusion and public disclosure torts--do fit as obvious
cases of the gathering of knowledge without warrant that might make per-
sons subject to evaluation. But why should the "false light" and "appro-
priation of name or likeness" torts come to be associated with privacy
and not with defamation and theft of a property interest, respectively? 22
The analysis of the privacy norm proposed above suggests that one rea-
son the "false light" tort came to be associated with privacy is that the
snoop or gossip typically wants to make "the best" of private knowl-
edge-make others look as bad as possible-by twisting what has been
learned into a form which makes evaluations of certain kinds most obvi-
20. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). For a different classification which
takes into account recent Supreme Court cases, see Bostwick, Comment-A Taxonomy of Privacy:
Repose, Sanctuary and Intimate Decision, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1447 (1976).
21. Prosser, supra note 20, at 389.
22. Compare Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093 (1962)(the
false light tort should replace defamation) with Kalven, supra note 10, at 331 (the appropriation tort
is actually unjust enrichment by the theft of good will).
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ous and most titillating. Indeed Prosser might have named this the "gos-
sip's tort" because privacy is here invaded only when private information
is actually placed in a false judgmental light. The "false light" tort prob-
ably also came to be associated with privacy because the partial informa-
tion gathered by invasions of privacy often is not seen in the intimate
context of a whole life and is thus likely, when revealed, to suggest or
encourage misleading or mistaken evaluations.
The reason the "appropriation of name or likeness" tort came to be
associated with privacy, and not considered a kind of theft of property,
the analysis here suggests, is that at the end of the last century the use of
someone's name or likeness in commercial enterprises might have sub-
jected that person to strong social censure. In 1900 a young woman's
chances for marriage, and thus her life chances, could, for example, have
been spoiled by her becoming a "public" person. This was so because, in
that day, women were so extraordinarily vulnerable to criticism that they
needed to be especially private persons. Attaching a name or likeness to a
commercial product might be seen as equivalent to the loss of a woman's
virtue or at least an invitation to the loss of that virtue.
Thus, it is apparent that both the "false light" and "appropriation"
torts do have an evaluational element, and that it is this element which is
essential to understanding the privacy interest the tort invades. It is also
apparent that all four of Prosser's torts can be connected to the privacy
norm when that norm is understood to protect the interest in being free of
the potential for certain unwarranted evaluations.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY
A. Griswold v. Connecticut 23
In 1964 the Supreme Court faced a challenge to Connecticut's statute
proscribing the use of contraceptives. There seemed to be general agree-
ment on the Court that the Connecticut statute was, in Justice Stewart's
words, "an uncommonly silly law.''24 The question, of course, was
whether it infringed basic constitutional protections, especially the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause.
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, made roughly the following ar-
gument: The doctrine of substantive due process has been discredited.
The Supreme Court should not substitute its judgment for that of the state
legislatures regarding precisely what liberties persons shall and shall not
have. "We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom,
23. 331 U.S. 479 (1965).
24. Id. at 527.
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need and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business af-
fairs, or social conditions," he asserted. 25 However, the Court does feel
responsible to secure persons against state actions which would abridge
their fundamental rights. 26 The meaning of "liberty" in the due process
clause is thus to be defined, not as the Court should unilaterally decide,
but according to the Court's understanding of the meaning of "fundamen-
tal rights." 27 Following this principle, Douglas discovered a "fundamen-
tal" right of privacy in the "penumbras" of several of the rights of the
Bill of Rights and by means of this right and the due process clause struck
down the Connecticut statute. In reasoning from the right of privacy to
Connecticut's contraceptives statute Douglas' argument seemed to take
two alternative courses. The first involved a serious conceptual error, and
the second reached the statute only indirectly.
By reading the right of privacy discovered in the penumbras to protect
"private life," where the latter meant those parts of a citizen's life which
should be kept free from state interference to provide for certain autono-
mous choices, the Connecticut statute could be reached easily and di-
rectly. The Court needed only to decide that included in "private life" is
the use of contraceptives. But this employment of privacy involves a pun
on "private," an equivocation in meaning. 28 The Court attempted to re-
strict the reach of the concept of liberty in the due process clause by limit-
ing its meaning to "fundamental rights," but then discovered a right-
the right of privacy-which it used in a way its limitation was ostensibly
designed to avoid. The Court could find the contraceptives statute uncon-
stitutional, on this line of reasoning, only by deciding unilaterally what
our personal autonomy shall be. This argument not only failed to avoid
some of the evils of substantive due process, 29 it also had nothing to do
with the privacy norm, discussed above.
The second argument which Douglas seemed to use was less direct in
its application but did use the fight of privacy in a manner consistent with
the privacy norm. The argument was that a statute like Connecticut's can
25. Id. at 482.
26. Id. at485.
27. There has, of course, been considerable disagreement on the Court since 1937 as to just
which rights are fundamental rights. Do they include all or only some of the rights of the Bill of
Rights? Do they include any rights not specified in the Bill of Rights? For discussion of these issues.
see L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 567-69.
28. 1 owe this important point to Gross, Privacy and Autonomy, NoMos xni: PRIVACY 169.
180-81 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1971). Indeed, as Gross has noticed, there is a double temp-
tation to conceptual error here, first by puns on "private" and, second, by equating the whole range
of "right to be let alone" with the "right to privacy."
29. As the discussion in D infra indicates, the Court is not clear at this point, or in subsequent
cases, about whether it is all autonomous choices or only those relating to particularly intimate or




be found unconstitutional for infringing on a right of privacy if the con-
duct it restricts is nearly always carried on in private, and if enforcement
procedures would involve such extensive privacy invasions as to
outweigh the benefits achieved by making the conduct a crime. On this
argument it was not the substance of the statute but the costs of its en-
forcement which was attacked directly. 30
The difficulty in Griswold is that Douglas' opinion for the Court did
not make clear just which of these two arguments was being used. Doug-
las quoted approvingly from Boyd v. United States:31 "It is not the break-
ing of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the
essence of the offence [against the right of privacy]; but it is the invasion
of [the] indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and pri-
vate property.... ",32 This suggests that Douglas was using the argument
in which the right of privacy is taken to protect personal autonomy. Just
over one paragraph further on, however, Douglas asked rhetorically:
"Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bed-
rooms for the telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?" 33 This, of
course, suggests he was using the second, indirect argument-the argu-
ment in which enforcement of the statute would breach the privacy norm.
Moreover, it is not even clear from his presentation of the "penumbra"
arguments which right Douglas discovered. 34 Indeed, the very ambiguity
present in his use of privacy to strike down the Connecticut statute is also
present in his penumbra precedents. For example, that part of the right of
privacy found in the penumbras of the first amendment's right of associa-
tion was said to be evident both in NAACP v. Alabama35 where Douglas
found" 'privacy in one's associations' [protected against] [d]isclosure of
membership lists' 36-a clear instance of protection of the privacy norm,
and also in Pierce v. Society of Sisters37 and Meyer v. Nebraska38 where
the issue was the right of parents to choose the schools, and the language
30. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). For a state case in which the enforcement line of reasoning is used
explicitly, see Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975), where an Alaska statute proscribing
marijuana use was struck down as it pertains to use in the home. But see also State v. Smith, 93 Wn.
2d 329, 345-48, 610 P.2d 869, 879-81 (1980), where the enforcement argument on marijuana use in
the home was rejected.
31. 116 U.S. 616,630 (1886).
32. 381 U.S. at 484 note (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 485.
34. The penumbra argument found the constitutional right of privacy in the penumbras of the first
amendment's rights of association, the third amendment's rights against the quartering of soldiers,
the fourth amendment's right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the fifth amendment's
rights against self-incrimination. Id. at 484.
35. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
36. 381U.S.at483.
37. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
38. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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used in schools, for their children-an equally clear instance of protecting
autonomous parental choices against state interference.
In four cases which followed Griswold this systematic ambiguity in the
Court's use of the right of privacy becomes increasingly evident and trou-
blesome.
B. Griswold's Progeny
In Stanley v. Georgia,39 which struck down Georgia's obscenity statute
as it pertained to possession of obscene materials in the home, Justice
Marshall wrote for the majority: "Moreover, in the context of this
case . . . [the right to receive information and ideas] takes on an added
dimension. For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very
limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's
privacy." 40 Marshall's argument here makes it sound like he was dealing
with the privacy norm, but immediately he quoted Brandeis' famous dis-
sent in Olmstead v. United States:4 1
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to
the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiri-
tual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of
the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emo-
tions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the
right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized man. 42
This language seems to refer to a right of personal autonomy. To add to
the ambiguity, Marshall then cited Griswold and NAACP v. Alabama4 3 in
support of the claim he is making here.
Similar difficulties appear in the Court's reasoning in Eisenstadt v.
Baird.44 There the issue was, again, a contraceptives statute, Baird hav-
ing been convicted of giving contraceptive foam to an unmarried woman
contrary to a Massachusetts statute. Justice Brennan, speaking for the
Court, argued:
If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons
cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be
equally impermissible .... If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
39. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
40. Id. at 564.
41. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
42. 394 U.S. at 564 (emphasis added).
43. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).




right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child. 45
Brennan's very choice of words exposes the confusion. Government does
not intrude into a decision, it intrudes into privacy; it interferes with a
decision. The availability of contraceptives for use by unmarried persons
is a matter of the right of personal autonomy, not a matter of the privacy
norm right of privacy. To add to the confusion, Brennan cited Stanley and
quoted Marshall at the point at which Marshall appears to have used both
senses of privacy. 46
By 1973, in Roe v. Wade,47 Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court
ignored the privacy norm completely, using only the autonomy argument.
Blackmun cited Stanley, Boyd, Olmstead (Brandeis' dissent), Griswold,
Eisenstadt, Meyer and Pierce, among others, and then said of the right of
privacy:
.. whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of per-
sonal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the
District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights
to the people, [it] is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 48
The right of privacy, in the sense of personal autonomy, is broad enough
to guarantee a woman's right to make decisions whether to have an abor-
tion, provided, of course, one reads the abortion laws as involving un-
justified state paternalism as Blackmun apparently did. Blackmun could
not, however, connect the abortion issue to the privacy norm, because
there is not any concern in Roe v. Wade, analogous to the concern in
Griswold, over police searches of private places.49 Without privacy norm
issues raised in some way, it was very difficult for the Court to conceal,
as it was able to conceal in the earlier cases, the independence of the
autonomy right from the privacy norm right. Additionally, the way was
open for the Court to ignore the interests protected by the privacy norm
right when they arose in the future.
45. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
46. Id. at 453 n.10.
47. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
48. Id. at 153.
49. This is not to say, however, that abortion could never invoke privacy norm considerations.
If, for example, some benighted state legislature passed a law requiring the publication of the names
of women who have undergone abortions, the privacy norm would be violated. For an analogous




In Paul v. Davis50 a photograph of respondent Davis was included in a
"flyer" of "active shoplifters" distributed by Police Chief Paul, even
though Davis had only been arrested and not convicted at the time of dis-
tribution. Davis sued, alleging among other things that the flyer deprived
him of his constitutional right of privacy. 5' Justice Rehnquist, in the ma-
jority opinion, acknowledged that the Court has recognized "zones of
privacy," which recognition has resulted in suppression of evidence
seized in unreasonable searches and protection of activities "relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child
rearing and education." 52 Rehnquist failed, however, to identify the pri-
vacy norm interests which underlie protections against unreasonable
searches and failed to distinguish clearly these interests from the auton-
omy interests related to marriage, procreation, etc. He noted that Davis
was not seeking "to suppress evidence seized in the course of an unrea-
sonable search, . . ." and then, without considering ways other than un-
reasonable searches in which the privacy norm right might be breached,
gave his primary attention to the claim that there were autonomy interests
at stake in the case, despite the fact that autonomy is the wrong category
for Davis' case. 53 He spoke of the autonomy line of right of privacy cases
as "defying categorical description" but as "deafing] generally with
substantive aspects of the Fourteenth Amendment" and limiting "the
States' power to substantively regulate conduct." He then said:
Respondent's claim is far afield from this line of decisions. He claims
constitutional protection against the disclosure of the fact of his arrest on a
shoplifting charge. His claim is based, not upon any challenge to the State's
ability to restrict his freedom of action in a sphere contended to be 'pri-
vate,' but instead on a claim that the State may not publicize a record of an
official act such as an arrest. None of our substantive privacy decisions hold
this or anything like this, and we decline to enlarge them in this manner. 54
50. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
51. Davis also alleged that he was deprived of liberty without due process by being branded a
criminal without benefit of trial. Id. at 697-712. This issue is not discussed here.
52. 424 U.S. at 712-13. The Court has not extended this right to homosexual conduct. Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F.Supp. 1199 (1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1975), or to sodo-
mous heterosexual conduct when third persons are watching or participating. Lovisi v. Slaton, 363
F. Supp. 620 (1973), affd 539 F.2d 349 (1976), cert. denied, Lovisi v. Zahradnick, 429 U.S. 977
(1976).
53. 424 U.S. at 713. Rehnquist apparently failed to notice, as Douglas noticed in Griswold, that
rights against unreasonable searches protect the privacy norm by focusing on the threats to privacy
inherent in criminal enforcement processes. See notes 22-33 and accompanying text supra. Suppres-
sion of evidence is, of course, a means of protecting privacy which might be invaded during such
processes. At stake in Davis was the privacy norm issue interest against extensive and misleading




Davis's concern over disclosure of his arrest by the state surely raised
only privacy norm issues. Indeed, Davis's was a classic privacy norm
situation because the publication and distribution of the flyer encouraged
unwarranted, unauthorized, and false evaluations of his character. But
because Rehnquist did not identify clearly or correctly the privacy norm
sense of the right of privacy (it was not merely a matter of suppression of
evidence), he was satisfied to dismiss Davis's claim for not presenting
issues akin to those in the personal autonomy cases. Paul v. Davis thus
dramatically demonstrates the danger of fuzzy definitions of privacy, and
shows that insistence on the proper identification of the interest protected
by a right is more than a matter of semantics. It is ultimately an appeal to
the proper resolution of cases. 55
C. Whalen v. Roe 56 -An Additional Confusion
By 1977 there had been sufficient comment in the literature, 57 espe-
cially on Roe v. Wade, that the Court could finally acknowledge expli-
citly, in the words of Justice Stevens in Whalen v. Roe, that: "The cases
sometimes characterized as protecting 'privacy' have in fact involved at
least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in in-
dependence in making certain kinds of important decisions.'"58 For lack
of a clear understanding of these two interests, however, Stevens' attempt
to apply the two rights of privacy to the issues in Whalen is confused, and
confused in a new and complicating way.
In Whalen the question was the constitutionality of a New York statute
which classified potentially harmful drugs and required that reports be
filed with the State Health Department when such drugs were dispensed.
55. Properly analyzed, Davis's claim should have been upheld, and the state action struck down
through the due process clause as a violation of the privacy norm right. Justice Brennan, in dissent on
the privacy issue, argued the case well:
Essentially, the core concept would be that a State cannot broadcast such factual events as the
occurrence of an arrest that does not culminate in a conviction when there are no legitimate law
enforcement justifications for doing so, since the State is chargeable with the knowledge that
many employers will treat an arrest the same as a conviction and deny the individual employ-
ment or other opportunities on the basis of a fact that has no probative value with respect to
actual criminal culpability.
424 U.S. 713,735, n.18.
56. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
57. See, e.g., Roe& Paris, Does Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1163-66
(1974)(two meanings of privacy distinguished-control of information, autonomy); Lecture by Philip
B. Kurland, The Private I: Some Reflections on Privacy and the Constitution, The Nora and Edward
Ryerson Lecture (April 27, 1976) reprinted by the University of Chicago (cited by Justice Stevens in
majority opinion. 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.24).
58. 429 U.S. at 598-600 (footnotes omitted).
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Suit was brought by patients regularly receiving such drugs and their pre-
scribing doctors. The basis of their constitutional claim was that the New
York statute invades a "protected zone of privacy." After presenting the
argument which recognized the two interests in privacy, Stevens reasoned
as follows:
Appellees argue that both of these interests are impaired by this statute. The
mere existence in readily available form of the information about patients'
use of Schedule II drugs creates a genuine concern that the information will
become publicly known and that it will adversely affect their reputations.
This concern makes some patients reluctant to use, and some doctors reluc-
tant to prescribe, such drugs even when their use is medically indicated. It
follows, they argue, that the making of decisions about matters vital to the
care of their health is inevitably affected by the statute. Thus, the statute
threatens to impair both their interest in the nondisclosure of private infor-
mation and also their interest in making important decisions indepen-
dently. 59
Stevens then addressed each of these interests, accepting them as prima
facie legitimate and distinct. Unfortunately, a correct analysis of the facts
in Whalen would have revealed but one privacy-related issue.
The first theory of the appellees was, indeed, a privacy norm theory. It
expressed understandable concern regarding the potential for release of
private medical information which could make both patients and doctors
subject to social scrutiny. 60 This part of their appeal appears correctly
focused on exactly that point. An independent interest in personal choice
was not, however, presented by the second theory as appellees proposed.
Instead, it was the privacy norm interest repeated in different terms. One
of the reasons a privacy right is important, as indicated in Part I, is that it
assures circumstances in which persons need not fear the scrutiny and
thus the judgment of others. The specific liberty provided by the right of
privacy, when it is promoting the privacy norm, is the liberty to talk, to
act, and to engage in certain activities free of the potential for judgment
by others. Without privacy we might not act because we would be fearful
of the consequences of revelations. Appellees' second theory in Whalen
only raised, again, privacy in the privacy norm sense, though it did raise
it in the terms of the specific personal liberty protected by the privacy
norm right. The majority's endorsement of this second claim as the appli-
cation of the autonomy sense of the right of privacy misconceived the
relationship between the autonomy right and the privacy norm right.
59. Id. at 600 (emphasis added).
60. Stevens ultimately held that New York had provided sufficient safeguards for the release of





Clarification of this new confusion regarding the Court's use of the right
of privacy will conclude this article.
D. Liberty and the Two Privacies
The right of privacy in the autonomy sense is potentially a very broad
right. Prior to Whalen the Court seemed to have limited its protections to
autonomous choices relating to "marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, and child rearing and education." But this right can,
with a little stretching, be taken to protect all autonomous choice, i.e., all
political liberty. This can be done with ease if the elasticity in the mean-
ing of "autonomy" is fully exploited. "Personal autonomy" usually re-
fers to a fairly narrow set of liberties from unwarranted state paternalism,
especially as that paternalism interferes with particularly intimate or per-
sonal choices, but it can also refer to all protected liberties-all auton-
omy, thus liberty equivalent to the broad ideal of personal liberty. But
when personal autonomy is taken to be equivalent to personal liberty,
understood in this generic sense, the right to personal autonomy ceases to
protect a specific liberty of its own, because the personal liberty ideal
merely serves as a shorthand way of referring to that collection of specific
liberties which, when taken together, are supposed to be the whole liberty
of individuals in a liberal state. This means that any specific right, like the
privacy norm right, necessarily becomes an instance of the generic right
to personal autonomy, because the liberty protected by the specific right,
in this case the liberty to act free of certain observations or disclosures, is,
by definition, an instance of the generic ideal of personal liberty.
So Stevens was correct in Whalen to recognize the privacy norm issues
in the threat of disclosure of prescription information. He was also correct
to recognize that the specific liberty at stake in this case is the liberty to
conduct parts of one's life, to make certain personal choices, without dis-
closure. What he failed to recognize was that this liberty is merely the
liberty protected by the privacy norm right. It can be viewed as being
protected by the personal autonomy right only if "personal autonomy" is
first stretched to mean what the generic ideal of personal liberty means
and then the specific liberty protected by the privacy norm right is cited as
one of its instances. This not only invites a new set of confusions, just at
the moment when the Court seemed on the verge of separating its two
rights of privacy, it also opens the way for full revitalization of that type
of substantive due process reasoning so often disparaged. Prior to
Whalen, the narrowly defined autonomy right of privacy had at least been
limited to protecting a specific set of liberties relating to home and family
life. The more expansive personal autonomy right has no such limita-
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tions, however, and consequently cannot preclude that sort of freewheel-
ing Court determination of specific personal liberties typically associated
with the least attractive forms of substantive due process. 6'
III. CONCLUSION
When Justice Douglas discovered the right of privacy in the penumbras
of the Bill of Rights in Griswold he opened a conceptual Pandora's box.
To think clearly about this right, potential ambiguities in the use of con-
cepts like "privacy," "personal autonomy," and "personal liberty"
needed to be avoided. Unfortunately, the Court, in trying to protect a
number of important interests, has not thought at all clearly about these
concepts. Consequently, it has resolved at least one case incorrectly, 62
and continues to reason in ways that will invite errors in the future.
When Noah condemned Ham to a life of servitude he expressed dra-
matically both the high value of privacy and the presumptuousness of the
privacy invader. We do have an interest in being free of the evaluations of
others, and persons who invade privacy need to recognize that the privacy
norm protects this important, specific interest. If the Supreme Court is
going to treat these issues with the care and sensitivity they deserve, then
it needs to recognize, and articulate clearly, the privacy norm interest pro-
tected by one of the rights of privacy it has discovered. It also needs to
distinguish correctly this interest from the interest in making certain par-
ticularly intimate and personal choices, which is protected by a different,
quite specific and distinct autonomy right of privacy. Then it can avoid
accusations that it is arrogating to itself the sweeping powers of the more
infamous forms of substantive due process jurisprudence, even if it can-
not avoid the charge that it created the autonomy right out of a play on
words. 63
61. See notes 28-29 and accompanying text supra.
62. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
63. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
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